

The Changing Politics of Peacekeeping

China's impact on United Nations peacekeeping

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ABSTRACT

United Nations peacekeeping is the most highly politicized of human rights activities as both the intervention in the name and preservation of those rights. The changing nature of UN peacekeeping has seen an exponential increase in Chinese participation. While most commentators seek to explain Chinese motivations, I examine the impact of increased Chinese participation in UN peace operations. The following study includes an analysis of the Chinese role in the two key areas of peacekeeping: UN Security Council voting on peace operations and the construction of peace operation mandates. Using both quantitative (abstaining versus voting) and qualitative (case examples of Chinese peacekeeping) evidence, there is a possibility of creating a unique study of the way in which peace operations can be altered by the new participation of a major international actor. The cases to be examined include Chinese role with respect to UN peacekeeping in the Sudan and in East Timor. Each of these cases challenge the idea that China has a narrow focus on sovereignty in international affairs. I hypothesize that, through a feedback loop, China has begun to impact and structure the international discourse on peacekeeping with an increased emphasis on national sovereignty along with less robust missions. I do not expect to explain Chinese behavior with respect to peacekeeping as the opaqueness of state decision-making is beyond the scope of this study. Instead I wish to explain Chinese impact on UN peace ops with an attention to the fundamental dilemmas facing peace operations: political will ambivalence and mandate ambiguity.

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INTRODUCTION

China's vacillating role in United Nations (UN) peace operations perplexes analysts. On the one hand, China (PRC)¹ has historically held a negative view of UN peacekeeping. Huang Hu, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in the 1970s, described even a traditional mission such as UN Emergency Forces II (UNEF II) as potentially having "infinite evil consequence in its wake and pav[ing] the way for further international intervention in the Middle East with the Superpowers as the behind the scene bosses."² In contrast, China currently supplies the most number of peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.³ The shift in the Chinese perspective on peacekeeping has not been linear with a mix of support and lack thereof for recent missions. This ambiguity creates a challenge for any study. Consequentially, most analysts have sought to explain Chinese behavior.⁴ These studies typically revolve around the ways in which China balances a focus on national sovereignty and increased participation in the international order as a 'responsible stakeholder' along with self-interested motivations such as solidifying the one-China policy.⁵ While meritorious studies seek to unravel the shift by China to the international norms supporting peacekeeping⁶, this analysis will seek to understand the feedback loop of increased Chinese participation. In doing so, I will begin to show how China has, "aim[s] to gradually counterbalance Western influence and more actively shape—in ways consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles and national interests—the norms

¹ Throughout this paper, I will refer to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as China.

² As quoted in Yeshi Choedon. "China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy". *China Report 2005*. Pg 39.

³ Tiewa Liu. "Marching for a More Open, Confident and Responsible Great Power: Explaining China's Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations". *Journal of International Peacekeeping*. Volume 13, Numbers 1-2. January 2009. See also **Annex 1: Chinese Peace Operations Participation**.

⁴ See Choedon, Liu, and Kim.

⁵ For a strong discussion of the motivations of Chinese behavior see the International Crisis Group report on Chinese peacekeeping as being rooted in the desire: to promote a multilateral agenda, be seen as a responsible power, gain operational benefits, protect Chinese interests abroad or support the One-China Policy. "China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping". *International Crisis Group*. Asia Report N166. 17 April 2009. Accessed online: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6062>.

⁶ One analyst finds that China tries acts rationally to maximize utility: "Chinese foreign policy behavior, manifest in the various domains of global politics, follows a real, if unstated, maxi/mini principle, maximizing China's rights and minimizing China's responsibilities." See Samuel Kim. "International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy". *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 519. Sage Publications, 1992. In contrast, other analysts find that China is acting within the normative parameters of the international system. See Iain Johnston. *Social States: China in International Institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 2007.

guiding UN peacekeeping operations.”⁷ By switching the focus, I will examine how China’s augmented role in peacekeeping impacts the process of peacekeeping itself.

Fundamentally, there are two areas in which China can impact peacekeeping: by voting for or blocking a specific mission and by shaping a mission mandate along with its operations. Through analyzing voting strategy, I will show how Chinese strategy has remained focused on the core value of sovereignty with support for traditional Chapter VI missions, which, in turn, adds to the caution of the international community in conducting more robust missions. To complicate these inferences on voting it should be noted that China has supported Chapter VII mandates, thereby creating a detrimentally ambivalent context for advocates of UN peacekeeping and intervention. In terms of shaping mandates, I will examine the development of two missions: UN peacekeeping in the Sudan through UNAMID and UN transitional authority in East Timor of UNTAET. Analysis here reveals the complexities of the Chinese impact as at once condemning and being involved in peacekeeping. In the end, the ambivalence and ambiguity in China’s impact on peacekeeping create a dialectic that enables operations but limits the scope of those efforts. Regardless of the normative arguments concerning the greater Chinese role in peacekeeping, I suggest that the scope of China’s impact cannot be denied.

PART I: METHODOLOGY AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS

Understanding China’s impact on UN peacekeeping requires a mixed methods approach that uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis of Chinese voting can reveal tendencies and how these tendencies relate to the changing periods of UN peacekeeping from stagnation during the Cold War to post Cold War non-linear increased activity.⁸ However, quantitative analysis does not give valuable details on how China relates

⁷ Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang. “China’s expanding peacekeeping role: Its significance and the policy implications”. *SIPRI Policy Brief*. February 2009. Pg 6.

⁸ The general periods of peacekeeping are considered to be documented as follows:

1946-56: Observer missions

1956-1974: First “golden age” including the first armed peacekeeping operations

1974-88: First lull in peacekeeping operations

1988-94: Second golden age when peacekeeping numbers

1994-1999: Second lull for UN peacekeeping but with increased regional operations

1999-present: Increasing peace operations with 13 new UN operations since 1999

From Ian Johnstone. “Peace Operations: Legal Framework”. Presentation to ILO L224. 21 September 2009.

to specific peacekeeping mandates. By using qualitative analysis, I will show the direct impact China has on mandates for the Sudan and East Timor.

Before proceeding with this mixed methods approach, it is necessary to review several preliminary concepts and terms. First, this paper generally uses the term peacekeeping but there is debate as to the different forms of peace operations. While I use the term peacekeeping broadly, it is important to note the original concept of peacekeeping⁹ is based on more specific concepts of consent of the parties or states involved, impartiality to the conflict, and the non-use of force except in self-defense. In contrast to these somewhat constraining traditional principles of peacekeeping, the concept I involve is broader, ranging from keeping of a pre-determined peace agreement ('peacekeeping') to building of a peace and supporting the development of a stable regime during conflict ('peacebuilding' or 'peacemaking') and even more militarized operations ('peace enforcement'). Peace operations understood in the broad sense are encapsulated in this concept of peacekeeping, thereby mitigating semantic concerns.

The legal basis for peacekeeping has also been a cause for debate. Although the UN Charter does not mention peacekeeping directly, it has become a significant part of UN activities.¹⁰ While no direct reference to peacekeeping is made, the UN Charter does give the UN a role in efforts of conflict negotiation and resolution in the name of preserving international peace and stability.¹¹ In fact, peacekeeping can be classified under the activities embodied in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter. The two key chapters associated with UN peacekeeping are Chapters VI and VII with Chapter VIII addressing regional arrangements. Peace operations under Chapter VI are typically considered 'soft' operations grounded in conflict resolution with the consent of parties or states. Chapter VII includes more coercive action based on UN Security Council authorization. Because many peace operations fall between these two areas, these activities are often based on 'Chapter VI 1/2' permissions, a

⁹ See the Report of the Secretary-General. "Summary Study of the experience derived from establishment of UNEF". A/3943. 1956. These traditional principles are further elaborated and expanded in the Agenda for Peace (1992), Brahimi Report (2000), and Capstone Doctrine (2008). See www.un.org/en/documents/.

¹⁰ For a discussion on the legal background of UN peacekeeping see Christine Gray. *International Law and the Use of Force*. New York City: Routledge Press 2nd edition, 2004. This study focuses on Ch VI/VII.

¹¹ See Article 33.1 of the UN Charter: *The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*

not formally legal reading of the UN Charter but a relevant understanding of the complex nature of peacekeeping.

Within the legal basis of peacekeeping, there is also an important distinction to be made between different types of peacekeeping missions. These typologies include traditional, multidimensional, robust, and transitional authority peacekeeping.¹² Traditional peacekeeping is associated with a Chapter VI mandate whereby there is a priority on traditional principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense.¹³ Multidimensional peacekeeping goes beyond the typical upholding of ceasefire in traditional peacekeeping to involve the activities by UN authorities including monitoring human rights and helping in development or transition.¹⁴ Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force in defense of a mission.¹⁵ The UN has also assumed a transitional authority role in certain conflict areas.¹⁶ In this case, the UN takes the role of domestic decision maker, controlling issues typically under state sovereignty such as the executive and legislative powers. These typologies will be key in understanding Chinese behavior in terms of support for certain types of peacekeeping. This support of China then links to the prevalent or predominant approach of the international community in dealing with conflict and displays the ways in which China can constrain or enable peacekeeping. Finally, these terms and concepts, including the typologies of peacekeeping and the legal basis of peace operations, will be referred to throughout the paper. In fact, the major concluding analysis will seek to address two broad conceptual issues for peacekeeping in reference to China's impact: political will with voting support and mandate clarity.

PART II: CHINESE VOTING ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Previous analysis of Chinese voting at the UN Security Council has focused on efforts by China to avoid the use of force without consent and general concern with Chapter VII mandates. These studies tend to analyze Chinese reticence to support sanctions or to violate

¹² William Durch ed. *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2006.

¹³ For example, the mandate for UN Emergency Forces I.

¹⁴ For example, the mandate for UN Support Missions in Haiti.

¹⁵ For example, the mandate for UN Operation in Somalia II.

¹⁶ For example, the mandate for UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.

the concept of state sovereignty. In contrast, I hope to examine the impact that Chinese voting has on whether certain types of peacekeeping missions emerge.

From condemnation to participation: Chinese voting on peacekeeping

Examining the data set of peacekeeping mandates and Chinese voting, we find that China initially had a policy of abstaining from and criticizing peace operations, even traditional operations.¹⁷ China abstained from voting on the majority of peacekeeping efforts during the Cold War period as, “the policy of nonparticipation bolstered domestic stability.”¹⁸ Chinese voting on peacekeeping breaks down into two periods: 1972 to 1989 and 1989 to 2009. While the early period of Chinese limited impact on peacekeeping is a topic of historical interest, the current period is more directly relevant to this study. The general shift is described well by Houser and Levy:

China has come a long way from its outright refusal to vote for or fund peacekeeping operations in the 1970s. Beijing’s first vote in favor of peacekeeping came in 1981, regarding the continuation of the UN mission in Cyprus. In 1990, China for the first time lent its own troops to a UN peacekeeping mission and in 1992 and 1993 sent 800 military engineers to Cambodia. Over the past six years [2001 to 2007], however, there has been a sea change in Chinese involvement in peacekeeping.¹⁹

The sea change of increased Chinese involvement has been a positive for advocates of peacekeeping in that missions are receiving more and more support from China.²⁰ Notably, China’s switch has a fundamental positive impact on peacekeeping as the state has become more involved with, first, general support of post Cold War missions and, second, in the logistical assistance China is now providing. Despite the beneficial increase in participation, Chinese voting pattern also maintains a priority on more traditional peacekeeping principles, “as the majority of peacekeeping missions take place with the consent of the host country.”²¹ China has come to support more missions while maintaining an interest in preserving the traditional principle of consent. The Chinese role in the post Cold War creation of

¹⁷ See **Annex 2: UN Peace Operations and Chinese Security Council Voting on Passed Mandates (1973 to Present)**.

¹⁸ M. Taylor Fravel. “China’s Attitude toward U.N. Peacekeeping Operations since 1989”. *Asian Survey*. Vol. 36, No. 11. CA: University of California Press, Nov 1996. Pg 1103.

¹⁹ Trevor Houser and Roy Levy. “Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy”. *China Security*. Issue 11. Summer 2008. Accessed online:

http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=8.

²⁰ See **Annex 1: Chinese Peace Operations Participation**.

²¹ Houser and Levy.

peacekeeping missions forces this caveat upon the perspective that post-Cold War UN peacekeeping has been more prolific and robust.

Typologies of peace operations and Chinese votes, a quantitative analysis

The general shift in Chinese voting on peacekeeping missions requires more specific analysis as to the types of missions supported by China. It can be suggested, then, that these preferred types of missions would be more likely to be pursued, as they would garner the support of China, one of the P-5. This study is based on testing of 45 cases where peacekeeping missions have come into existence since China, as the People’s Republic of China, has had a vote on the Security Council (post 1972). The data set varies across regions²² and includes both current and concluded missions.²³ The basic flaw in this information is that it does not encapsulate the missions that never came into existence, as it is difficult to quantify non-existing information. Limited as it might be, the data does focus general trends in Chinese voting with typologies of peacekeeping that fall along a ‘sovereignty spectrum’ based on Chapter VI to Chapter VII mandates. The information is summarized in the table below, which is generally based on research found in **Annex 2: UN Peace Operations and Chinese Security Council Voting (1973 to Present)** and with reference to the terms and concepts outlined in **Part II**:

	Positive Vote	Abstained	Negative Vote (Veto)	Proportional support
Traditional (Ch VI)	19 (83%)	3 (13%)	1 (4%)	42%
Multidimensional (Ch VI)	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	0	27%
Robust (Ch VI/VII)	5 (83%)	0	1 (17%)	11%
Transitional Authority (Ch VII)	3 (100%)	0	0	7%
Total (%)	87%	9%	4%	

Chart 1: Chinese voting and Mission Type²⁴

²² Not discussed in this section is the inference from the data set that China does not tailor its voting to regional preferences. For example, China does not limit peacekeeping in one area of the world. One might expect them to do so to limit regional interference in Asia; however, the range of regions, including several in Asia, where China has voted for a peacekeeping mission indicates otherwise.

²³ See **Annex II: UN Peace Operations and Chinese Security Council Voting (1973 to Present)**.

²⁴ Derived from analysis in **Annex II: UN Peace Operations and Chinese Security Council Voting (1973 to Present)**.

In absolute terms, China has supported both traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping at a high number (19 and 12 missions). This absolute level of support should contradict any argument that Chinese voting does not currently help sustain peacekeeping. In looking at the times when China has either abstained or voted against a resolution, it is key to view abstaining as a tacit statement of non-support. The strategy of abstaining is typical of China considering the fact that, from 1990 to 2008, “China abstained from votes on 35 Chapter VII resolutions, the most of any P5 member.”²⁵ It should also be noted that China rarely uses its veto.²⁶ According to this data, China does not often issue a negative vote on the peacekeeping mandates with just six such votes.

Moving beyond the absolute analysis, we find that China votes in support of multidimensional and transitional missions at the highest rate (92% and 100%) contrasted by high but less support of traditional and robust missions (both 83%). These types of peacekeeping missions fall along a basic sovereignty spectrum ranging from less to more infringing on sovereignty. One would expect China to vote for peacekeeping that does not infringe on sovereignty. With the exception of full support for transitional authorities²⁷, the data does appear to parallel this claim particularly as robust peacekeeping shares the lowest level of support from China. To sharpen these conclusions concerning Chinese voting as tending away from missions that infringe upon sovereignty, the study used a more relevant measurement of proportional support. Proportional support (possibility of a positive vote x total probability of a type of mission) shows the likelihood that China will support a given type of mission. China is much more likely to support a traditional mission at 42% proportional support than it is to support more robust missions. Even though China has not, according to this table, voted against a ‘transitional authority’ mission, the likelihood that China supports this type of mission is very low relative to other types of missions. Based upon this analysis, it is reasonable to claim that China supports traditional

²⁵ Houser and Levy.

²⁶ Houser and Levy find that, “One of the most striking trends in the UNSC voting data is the rarity with which China has exercised its veto compared to the other P5 countries. In fact, Beijing has only used its veto four times since joining the UNSC. Between 1971 and 2006, the United States vetoed 76 resolutions, the United Kingdom 24, France 14 and Russia 13. China traditionally prefers working aggressively behind the scenes to convince other UNSC members to drop, or at least modify the language of, resolutions it finds objectionable rather than publicly taking a stand by using a veto. If the other members insist on putting the resolution to a vote, China will generally abstain.”

²⁷ This support for transitional authority type peacekeeping will be discussed later with respect to East Timor. It should also be noted that the small number of such missions may skew the data.

peacekeeping based in Chapter VI and maintaining sovereignty conditions. As one qualitative study finds: “This framework of traditional-nontraditional principles conforms with China’s general attitude toward UN peacekeeping operations. Since the early 1980s, China has maintained a ‘traditional’ view of peacekeeping by stressing the importance of sovereignty and emphasizing consent and impartiality.”²⁸

In addition to the major conclusion that China is likely to vote for more traditional or sovereignty non-infringing peacekeeping missions, we see the complexity of Chinese voting as not purely outside the system. Instead, China is very involved in voting on peacekeeping and the major issue is not the level involvement, rather, Chinese voting on certain types of peacekeeping. In this way, China has evolved beyond non-interaction to recognize how to leverage and use its vote in support of more traditional missions, thereby impacting UN peacekeeping.

Reviewing ‘robust’ actions: Chinese voting on Chapter VII missions

Testing all peacekeeping mandates that have been passed gives a data set that, as discussed above, shows that China’s general approach is to vote for peacekeeping including a tendency towards support for Chapter VI, traditional and consent-based activities. To complicate this initial, broad reading of Chinese voting, it is necessary to turn to peace operations with a more robust Chapter VII mandate.²⁹ China usually seeks to avoid Chapter VII actions: “China exercised a veto or abstained from voting in resolutions regarding 17 of the 28 countries that have been subject of Chapter VII action since 1990.”³⁰ China’s lack of support for Chapter VII resolutions does not uniformly relate to Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. In five major cases of Chapter VII peacekeeping, China remained supportive.³¹

²⁸ Fravel, pg 1106.

²⁹ See **Annex 3: Chinese circumstantial (use of force and domestic) voting.**

³⁰ Houser and Levy.

³¹ It should be noted that the relatively small number of cases of peacekeeping with Chapter VII mandates (as defined by this study as specific reference to Chapter VII, see note 35) creates a situation where case-by-case analysis is most pertinent. Houser and Levy find that, “given the relatively small number of cases (only 28 countries were the subject of Chapter VII resolutions during the period in question) and the variety of factors affecting China’s position on each, a case-by-case assessment was needed.”

Major Chapter VII Operation	Chinese Voting Position
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II ³²	Support for the mission as long it is “respecting fully the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola” (Res 696)
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	Positive support based upon the Lomé peace agreement and responsibilities of the UN to monitoring the ceasefire, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance and assisting with disarmament
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	Support of the mission
African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Support after several abstaining votes on sanctions and focusing on Sudanese continued sovereignty
United Nations Operation in Somalia II	Support of the mission
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	Support based on “the will of the people of East Timor” ³³

Chart 2: Chinese Voting on Chapter VII Mandates³⁴

In terms of most Chapter VII resolutions, “the Chinese have consistently opposed the use of force.”³⁵ However, peacekeeping operations invoking Chapter VII have seen conditional support by China. For example, China supported these robust activities typically after a peace agreement had been reached, as exemplified by the support for the Mission in Sierra Leone after the Lomé agreement. Furthermore, China places a strong condition of a need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states involved matched by the necessity for the actions to be associated with the ‘will of the people’ across Chapter VII peacekeeping. Even though China supports many Chapter VII peacekeeping missions, it remains “sensitive to the issue of the use of force under UN auspices.”³⁶ One recent study shows that China will support robust UN action under Chapter VII as long as this is not

³² NB While the original mandate of UNAVEM II found in resolution 696 does not refer to Chapter VII activities, later expansion of the mandate is considered to do so.

³³ Speech by Mr. Chen Xu from 20 August 1999. Document classification S/PV.4035.

³⁴ The list includes resolutions that either contain an explicit reference to Chapter VII (“the Council is “Acting under Chapter VII”) or that make an explicit determination of a threat to, or breach of the peace, or act of aggression (in accordance with Article 39). See Johansson, Patrik, *UN Security Council Chapter VII resolutions, 1946-2002. An Inventory*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003.

³⁵ Yitzhak Shichor. “China’s Voting Behavior in the U.N. Security Council”. *China Brief*. No. 18. Sept. 6, 2006. Accessed online: <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2947.html>

10/31/2006; <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2947.html>

³⁶ Shichor.

coupled with a breakdown in the traditional peacekeeping principle of consent.³⁷ In this way, China impacts peacekeeping by generally supporting Chapter VII or robust actions at the same time as conditioning that support on traditional principles of peacekeeping like consent.

The impact of China on the ‘political will’ supporting peacekeeping

In seeking to understand the impact China has on UN peacekeeping, the analysis concerning Chinese voting has addressed issues within the broad category of political will. The first condition of political will is necessary for a peace operation to come into existence. While it may be impossible to discuss non-emerging peacekeeping missions, analysis of the Chinese role in using its veto concludes this study of Chinese voting and its impact on peacekeeping. China has openly opposed some missions including but not limited to “aspects of Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti by abstaining on the relevant Security Council resolutions.”³⁸ China places limitations on UN response to crisis by using the threat of the veto. While there may be limited explanation as to why China would limit these efforts³⁹, the impact is obvious: a condition of ambivalent political will. The capriciousness of Chinese voting combines with the inevitable slowness of response to crisis due to uncertain political will and support. Certainly, Chinese initial condemnation of peacekeeping has changed but, in terms of voting, China now has more power to alter the types of missions and to limit, in an opaque manner, the emergence of certain missions. The power of political will and the impact of ambivalence on peacekeeping is profound and far-reaching: “China’s conservative attitude toward peacekeeping...stems from the leadership’s ambivalence toward China’s position in the ‘new world order.’”⁴⁰

³⁷ See **Annex 3: Chinese circumstantial (use of force and domestic) voting.**

³⁸ Fravel, pg 1102.

³⁹ Fravel, pg 1108: “China’s pattern of opposition is nevertheless paradoxical, since not one of the major operations established since 1989, perhaps with the exception of UNTAC in Cambodia, has threatened China’s territorial security.”

⁴⁰ Fravel, pg 1102.

PART III: CASE STUDIES OF CHINESE IMPACT ON PEACEKEEPING IN THE SUDAN AND EAST TIMOR

Chinese voting on peacekeeping operations reveals an impact on political will with some 'traditional' limitations on peacekeeping. As a peacekeeping mission does come into existence, China also plays a role of creating that mission's mandate. In contrast to the concerns of political will or ambivalence, mandate ambiguity becomes a major issue for UN peacekeeping. Given China's traditional voting stance, the very first condition of many of the peacekeeping mandates is that they be based on a pre-determined peace agreement. In fact, the line between voting and mandate construction is not clear. Related to its voting strategy, China will support draft resolutions under specific conditions:

Beijing's justifications for its occasional abstentions that raised eyebrows at the beginning have been remarkably consistent. They include draft resolutions perceived by Beijing as interfering in the domestic affairs of countries or undermining their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. As a rule, the Chinese prefer that conflicts be settled by the parties concerned or, as a last option, by local and regional organizations, without external intervention, including that of the UN.⁴¹

China generally supports peacekeeping where conflict has been settled through an internally led agreement. In order to test this generalization and to show Chinese impact on specific UN peacekeeping mandates, I will first examine the case of China's role in shaping the peacekeeping efforts in the Sudan (Darfur). To further evaluate the impact of China on mandates, I will also explore the UN peacekeeping in East Timor as a transitional authority mission with potential major sovereignty concerns.

China and the Sudan (Darfur)

China's impact on the UN efforts in the Sudan further reflects the dialectical approach of eventually supporting but also limiting peacekeeping. This dialectic led to increased ambivalence and ambiguity for the mission, which came under harsh international criticism associated with China. The conflicted Chinese position displays the key dilemma for the country: "China's reluctance to use its influence to sway the Sudanese government to fully accept the mandate of a robust UN peacekeeping mission...exemplifies the current dilemma of China's peacekeeping strategy by putting its projected image as a responsible power

⁴¹ Shichor.

directly at odds with its will and ability to deliver the Sudanese government's concrete cooperation."⁴² This dilemma spills over and impacts the peacekeeping efforts in the Sudan. Before assessing this impact, the basic information concerning the situation in the Sudan deserves attention as it relates to Chinese involvement and the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

Background concerning the Sudan and UNAMID

The Sudan has been embroiled in conflict since independence, with a mix of civil, ethnic, and inter-state wars.⁴³ The conflict in Darfur, the Western region of the Sudan bordering Chad, can be traced to the violence in 2003 between the Sudanese government supporting the Arab militant group *Janjaweed* against rebel groups of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Escalating violence and mutual policies of attacking or displacing civilians created the impetus for eventual intervention by the international community in mid 2004 when the African Union (AU) sent a small monitoring group. The AU continued its involvement but was hampered by an unclear mandate and poor funding.⁴⁴

By 2005, the UN became engaged in addressing the conflict through sanctions resolutions, when the "Security Council belatedly moved to impose sanctions against those impeding the peace process and committing human rights violations...it took another year before any individuals were specifically targeted."⁴⁵ The UN decided to support a robust mission first through UNMIS in 2005, which focused on maintaining a ceasefire in Southern Sudan between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Sudanese government then expanded to include Darfur in August 2006. The UN then increased its activity with UNAMID in 2007. These missions conditioned UN/AU involvement on the consent of the Sudanese government. Currently, the conflict in Darfur is in a violent stalemate with a fragile peace

⁴² Bonny Ling. "China's peacekeeping diplomacy". *HRI China*. Accessed online: www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1_Peacekeeping.pdf+china+un+peacekeeping&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

⁴³ Much of this information comes from UNAMID Background on peacekeeping in Darfur (<http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=890>) and International Crisis Group Reports (See Nick Grono. "Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect." *African Affairs*. Vol. 105, No. 421. Oxford University Press, Oct 2006.). Please note that the case has been simplified in order to focus on key elements related to Chinese involvement and impact along with the goal of being laconic.

⁴⁴ Grono, pg 625.

⁴⁵ Grono, pg 628.

process underway, restricted by the lack of support by the Sudanese government and President Omar Al-Bashir, who was indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in 2009.

Chinese influence and impact on UNAMID

The hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission came into legal existence in July 2007 with Resolution 1769 following Resolutions 1590 and 1706; however, in the lead up to this mandate China played a complex role by denying support of previous resolutions concerning Darfur and delaying the emergence of UNAMID. China's impact on peacekeeping in Darfur begins with limited support for UN resolutions prior to the UNMIS/UNAMID mandates: "Whenever the issue of Darfur was put on the UN Security Council agenda, China abstained (e.g. Resolutions 1556, 1564, 1591, 1593 and 1672). Most of these resolutions called for the imposition of travel and financial sanctions on Sudan under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."⁴⁶ In reference to previous analysis of China's reluctance to support Chapter VII resolutions, this formative influence is not unexpected. In fact, China explicitly sought to alter the sanctions resolutions, looking to make "major amendments to the texts."⁴⁷ China's impact extended to limiting the emergence of a peacekeeping mission in Darfur as, "attempts to bring Khartoum to book were repeatedly frustrated by China...it either abstained from casting its vote or threatened to use its veto."⁴⁸ Whether the motivation for this limitation was out of national interest or sovereignty concerns⁴⁹, the impact is clearly that of delaying response to crisis⁵⁰ and weakening initial political support for a clear, robust mandate in Darfur.

⁴⁶ Shichor.

⁴⁷ Speech by Mr. Wang Guangya. Security Council Sixtieth year, 5153rd meeting on Tuesday, 29 March 2005. New York City.

⁴⁸ Denis Tull. "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 44, No. 3. Cambridge University Press, Sep 2006. Pg 470.

⁴⁹ For an excellent discussion of motivations concerning the Sudan, see Houser and Levy: "While Beijing has shown a willingness to support a more active role for the UN in brokering ceasefires and keeping the peace, it clearly continues to view the relationship between a government and its people an issue of national sovereignty in which the international community has no business meddling. It is likely this, more than a hunger for Sudanese oil, that shapes Beijing's position in the UNSC when it comes to Darfur. And defense of Khartoum's right to deal with domestic affairs as it sees fit may actually be hurting rather than helping Chinese economic interests and energy security."

⁵⁰ There are also accusations that China delayed meetings of the Security Council and the Panel of Experts to limit progress on efforts in Darfur. See John Prendergast and David Sullivan. "Irresolution: The UN Security Council on Darfur". *Enough* Strategy paper 33. 24 Jul 2008. Accessed online: <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/irresolution-un-security-council-darfur>.

During the emergence of the mandate for UNMIS then expanded to Darfur and, eventually, the UNAMID mandate, China influenced UN peacekeeping by being the “principal impediment” causing the process to “move too slowly”.⁵¹ When the more robust mandate emerged in 2006 and 2007, China placed an emphasis on the condition of Sudanese consent as, “deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur...[was] effectively conditioned on the consent of Khartoum.”⁵² When China began to come to support UN activities in Sudan, it initially served to split rather than consolidate efforts concerning Darfur:

While the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) started to operate in southern Sudan with Chinese support in March 2005, AMIS remained responsible for Darfur. This example of the split mission in southern and western Sudan clearly shows...[that] Beijing will support peace support operations but will also resist interferences in internal affairs as long as the host country does not agree to the mission.⁵³

China did eventually support the expansion of the UNMIS mandate in Resolution 1706, despite initially abstaining, and the UNAMID mandate in Resolution 1769.⁵⁴ When UNMIS transitioned to include activities in Darfur through Resolution 1706, there was a focus on Sudanese sovereignty.⁵⁵ The Chinese delegate found that “the mission can be deployed only when the consent of the Government of National Unity is obtained.”⁵⁶ Resolution 1769 contrasts the ‘watered down’ nature of these previous resolutions with a focus on more robust action of all “necessary action” (Para 15 a) along with a sustained political process in

⁵¹ Houser and Levy: “Human rights groups criticize the UN Security Council (UNSC) for moving too slow and point to Beijing, which holds a permanent seat and a veto, as the principal impediment.”

⁵² Grono, pg 628.

⁵³ From Stefan Staehle. “China’s Participation in the United Nation Peacekeeping Regime”. MA Thesis. George Washington University, 2006. Pg 43.

⁵⁴ While this analysis may place significant responsibility on China for limits on UN activities in Darfur, the reactionary role of other key international actors should be noted including that of the US. Finally, it is important to note that, despite reluctance, China did come to support the UNMIS and UNAMID mandates. As Shichor notes: “Beijing considers Darfur an internal affair that should be solved by Sudan’s government, assisted by regional organizations such as the African Union. Yet, for all its interests in Sudan and its opposition to sanctions, Beijing did not veto the proposal.”

⁵⁵ See the third preamble paragraph: “*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which would be unaffected by transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur, and to the cause of peace, *expressing its determination* to work with the Government of National Unity, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various problems confronting the Sudan and that a United Nations operation in Darfur shall have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and character”.

⁵⁶ Speech by Mr. Wang Guangya. Security Council Sixty-first year, 5519th meeting on 31 August 2006. New York City.

the face of Sudanese government unconstructive activities.⁵⁷ That having been said, the protection of civilians clause in the UNAMID mandate remained “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (Para 15 a.ii), an addition that does not then focus that responsibility on the necessity of government to protect civilians. Such an addition is indicative of a Chinese priority on sovereignty.⁵⁸ Finally, the mandate ambiguity influenced by China extended to limited repercussions for noncompliance by the major actors in the conflict: “At the behest of Sudan and its allies (China and the Arab League), all reference to the threat of sanctions was removed from the text if Sudan were to obstruct compliance with the resolution.”⁵⁹ The new compliance language of Resolution 1769 included such weak, ambiguous terms as “welcomes” and “looks forward to” government of Sudan and rebel parties political cooperation (Para 18/19). Chinese impact on the UNAMID mandate ranged from the focus on Sudanese sovereignty creating an ambiguous mandate for protecting civilians to limited recourse for punishing behavior contrary to Resolution 1769 or UNAMID.

Beyond these initial impacts, China also altered the operational elements of UN activities in Darfur. China’s operational impact supports the theme of increased, important participation contrasted by significant limitations. In the linkage between mandate language and operations, China pushed for a focus on AU military competencies⁶⁰, which brought an important regional component to the mission but also created initial command and control confusion. Despite this negative impact, some would argue that it was the participation of China, which does send personnel to UNAMID/Darfur⁶¹, that was a catalyst for eventual increase in the UN peacekeeping role in the region: “It was Chinese pressure on Sudan that was key to getting UN peacekeepers into the Darfur region.”⁶² At the same time, the key limitations on the operations of UNAMID link inexorably to the conditionality of language

⁵⁷ For a discussion of the strengths and limits of Resolution 1769, see Roberta Cohen. “Will Security Council Resolution 1769 make a difference in Darfur?”. Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. 9 August 2007. Accessed online: www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/cohen_20070809.pdf.

⁵⁸ Cohen, pg 3.

⁵⁹ Cohen, pg 3. NB This lack of repercussions for not following the resolution or the mandate is especially important considering later behavior by Sudan in attacking UNAMID convoys.

⁶⁰ Speech by Mr. Wang Guangya. Security Council Sixty-first year, 5519th meeting on 31 August 2006.

⁶¹ See **Annex 1: Chinese Peace Operations Participation.**

⁶² “China mulls larger UN peace role”. *Aljazeera News*. Reporter: Melissa Chan. 6 December 2009. Accessed online: <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/12/200912644816324399.html>. Cohen also notes that the “most potent pressure” would be that of China.

in its mandate, which China helped to construct. The Chinese impact on UN peacekeeping in the Sudan (Darfur) displays the theme of limited support, particularly in a context of international uncertainty. Ultimately, this case reveals the ambiguous nature of Chinese participation: “There will be limits to its participation, and it is unlikely that China will offer active support to international intervention when the international community is divided and the intended host government is opposed.”⁶³

China and East Timor

China’s impact on peacekeeping in East Timor is developed as a second analysis of how Chinese involvement alters missions. The case of peacekeeping in East Timor is of high interest because, first, it is in the Asian region along with China and, second, the level of control assumed by the UN during the transitional authority appears antithetical to Chinese priorities on sovereignty. In addition, East Timor was involved in a secession process leading to independence, a situation that China is sensitive to with respect to Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. Needless to say, this case presents challenges to the typical conceptualization of Chinese perspective on UN peacekeeping. After exploring relevant background information concerning East Timor, I will display China’s sequential impact on the lead up to the emergence of UNTAET, the language of the establishing resolution, and the Chinese influence of UNTAET operation.

Background concerning East Timor and UNTAET

The UN has been involved in five recent peacekeeping missions in East Timor: UNAMET (1999), INTERFET (1999-2000), UNTAET (1999-2002), UNMISSET (2002-2005), and UNMIT (2006-onward).⁶⁴ These missions have, except for UNAMET where the UN served as an impartial assistant for an independence referendum, centered on developing East Timor as an independent nation. The UN has acted as a transitional authority with high levels of control of the Timorese political process. East Timor voted to become an independent country after long contesting Indonesian presence through popular guerilla

⁶³ Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang. “China’s expanding peacekeeping role: Its significance and the policy implications”. *SIPRI Policy Brief*. February 2009. Pg 6.

⁶⁴ Durch, pg 389-390. Information from Chapter 6: East Timor by Michael Smith and Moreen Dee. NB As with the Sudan/Darfur case, I will not explore the full history or details of the conflict in East Timor; preferring, instead, to focus on key elements that relate to UNTAET and Chinese involvement.

protestation led by the Falintil, the armed forces for national liberation in East Timor. The Falintil existed as the military arm of the Fretilin, the revolutionary front for an independent East Timor, an organization supported in its early existence by China for ideological reasons.⁶⁵ Years of conflict culminated in an unexpected referendum on autonomy called by Indonesian President Habibie in August 1999 and assisted by the UN, where the majority of East Timor voted in favor of independence.

Newly independent, East Timor required significant development of state institutions. There was significant post-ballot violence that led to the evacuation of the first UN mission, UNAMET—a mission to oversee the referendum not a security operation. In response to this crisis, the UN was able to mobilize a robust operation in INTERFET. Then, the UN, through resolution 1272, became involved in this transitional process as the key authority possessing a high level of control in East Timorese domestic affairs: “United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)...will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.”⁶⁶ The establishment of UNTAET is of particular note as its “responsibilities surpassed all those of previous UN missions.”⁶⁷ Ultimately, UNTAET faced many challenges including issues with how to link UN efforts with local consultation and how to legally frame the mission. Despite these challenges, UNTAET was later replaced by UNMISET after independence was solidified in May 2002 and most domestic competencies were assumed by East Timor. In the end, UNTAET was able to successfully begin East Timor’s independent development.

Chinese influence and impact on UNTAET

China had long supported East Timor independence; however, the Chinese did not automatically support the peacekeeping in East Timor even UNTAET, which explicitly was to facilitate East Timorese independence. In fact, China’s reluctance existed until after the referendum on independence in August 1999: “While Beijing had been reluctant to engage

⁶⁵ Ian Storey. “China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends”. China Brief Volume: 6 Issue: 14. 2 May 2007. Accessed online: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=3961](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3961).

⁶⁶ Resolution 1272, paragraph 1.

⁶⁷ Durch, pg 422.

in the process at first, it eventually grasped the opportunity to project its image as a responsible power, even more since it had already supported the referendum on East Timor's independence."⁶⁸ As with limited initial support of actions in the Sudan, it was not inevitable that China would support the UNTAET. China also used the leverage of its vote to condition the mandate on certain criteria: "In the discussion leading to this operation, the Chinese representative had insisted that Beijing's criteria for military interventions—consent of the target country and mandate of the UNSC—had to be met."⁶⁹ The Chinese delegate to the UN at the time, Qin Huasun, stated that movement forward would be based on East Timor desire for independence but that "the decision of the Indonesian Government and its good cooperation afterwards established conditions for the realization of that historic opportunity."⁷⁰ In the lead up to the emergence of UNTAET, China impacted efforts in East Timor through a combination of reluctance⁷¹ and conditionality of consent, particularly based on support by Indonesia.

In terms of the construction of the UNTAET mandate, we see the Chinese influence in the preamble of Resolution 1272:

Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999, and taking note of its outcome through which the East Timorese people expressed their **clear wish** to begin a process of transition under the authority of the United Nations towards independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese people. (emphasis mine)

Although violence had been high in East Timor, the UN did not take this more robust role until after 30 August 1999, when the East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum was called and East Timor popularly voted for independence. Chinese constructive support for the mandate came after East Timor had already become independent through the referendum.⁷² Even with the tremendous power to be assumed by UNTAET, the Chinese delegation still

⁶⁸ Staehle, pg 40.

⁶⁹ Staehle, pg 40.

⁷⁰ Speech by Mr. Qin Huasun. Security Council 4043rd meeting, Fifty-fourth year on 11 September 1999. New York City.

⁷¹ In fact, China even initially did not support the INTERFET emergency response: "When the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence from Indonesia in August 1999, Beijing initially refrained from supporting an international intervention force to quell the rising violence." From Ian Storey. "China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends".

⁷² See the Security Council 4057th meeting, Fifty-fourth year on 25 October 1999: "The Chinese delegation participated in the consultations on the draft resolution in a constructive spirit."

focused on East Timorese ‘clear wish’ and self-determination:

I also wish to note that East Timor will ultimately have to be governed by the East Timorese people themselves. The United Nations presence in East Timor is to assist that island’s people to achieve independence and self-reliance. Thus, the principle of the East Timorese people’s involvement as principal actor must be upheld and its wishes and choices respected.⁷³

China maintained the focus on East Timorese self-reliance despite the novel transitional powers of a mission that assumed many of the responsibilities of domestic affairs. The UNTAET mandate certainly did not have the same level of ambiguities, much less contradictions, of the UNAMID mandate for Darfur; however, it does display a complex interplay of Chinese influence supporting a mandate focusing on sovereignty and self-determination during an explicitly transitional authority based peacekeeping mission.

Along with impacting the initial creation of the UNTAET mandate and the language and focus of the establishing resolution, China also influenced the operations of UNTAET once it was created. Before UNTAET became active in February 2000, China made key directive statements. In December 1999, China focused on the need for local, East Timorese, presence through “the Consultative Commission of East Timor, which...is a good way to allow the local people to participate in the decision-making process.”⁷⁴ As UNTAET was at the early stage of its operation, China set a list of four mission goals broadly based on “reconstructing East Timor, particularly in rebuilding its infrastructure, building judicial institutions and establishing rule of law, and in creating employment”: 1) Encouraging a smooth transition from robust INTERFET to transitional UNTAET with an additional police component, 2) Supporting East Timorese self-governance through the National Consultative Council with increased levels of participation, 3) Achieving reconciliation based on increased inclusion in self-governance mechanisms, and 4) Improving relations between East Timor and Indonesia.⁷⁵ These goals generally sought to achieve earlier and greater self-governance for East Timor. While this focus is highly reasonable given the goal of a transfer of sovereign capacities, it does appear to shift a focus on involving more local voices that

⁷³ Speech by Mr. Shen Guofang, Security Council 4057th meeting, Fifty-fourth year on 25 October 1999. New York City.

⁷⁴ Speech by Mr. Chen Xu, Security Council 4085th meeting, Fifty-fourth year on 22 December 1999. New York City.

⁷⁵ Speech by Mr. Shen Guofang, Security Council 4097th meeting, Fifty-fifth year on 3 February 2000. New York City.

could have created increased domestic instability. The operational impact of China included a strong directional movement towards expedient East Timorese assumption of domestic controls.

In the end, China came to fully support UNTAET. China provided police and personnel support for only the second time in its history.⁷⁶ In fact, tacit support of the UN mission and East Timor independence crystallized when China became the first country to establish diplomatic ties with the country.⁷⁷ Chinese reluctance and conditionality in the lead up and construction of the UNTAET mandate should not disguise eventual Chinese support. As one analyst notes, despite the condition of Indonesian support and East Timorese self-sovereignty sought by China, “[UNTAET] surely should have constituted a serious problem for the PRC as a state that has ‘embraced the sovereignty concept with a vengeance’; yet, Beijing outwardly displayed few qualms with the about the mission.”⁷⁸ While UNTAET transitional authority was reframed by China with a focus on East Timorese self-determination, the mission was a relative success with Chinese support.⁷⁹ And, in comparison with Chinese impact on efforts in the Sudan, we find that, despite constraints, “China’s support for and interest in taking part in peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Haiti and Darfur all point to a more flexible view of intervention.”⁸⁰ China’s growing influence towards flexibility can be seen as a general positive of its impact on UN peacekeeping.

CONCLUSION

Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping has shifted dramatically over time. In its original position, Chinese views were inflammatory, condemning of peacekeeping: “[China] charged

⁷⁶ The first contribution came with respect to Cambodia in 1992. See **Annex 1: Chinese Peace Operations Participation**.

⁷⁷ From Storey, “China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends”: “At the stroke of midnight on May 20, 2002, East Timor became fully independent after three years under UN tutelage. The PRC became the first country to formally establish diplomatic relations with the world’s newest country.”

⁷⁸ Justin S. Hempson-Jones. “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?”. *Asian Survey*. Vol. 45, No. 5. Sep 2005. Pg 717.

⁷⁹ The success level of UN peacekeeping in East Timor is a matter of significant debate and should not be easy assumed. In terms of relative success, East Timor does appear to have been a ‘positive’ achievement of UN peacekeeping. For a discussion of the success and limitations in East Timor, see Michael Geoffrey Smith and Moreen Dee. *Peacekeeping in East Timor*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, October 2002.

⁸⁰ Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, pg 7.

that the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations was part of a plot to convert the UN into a 'US controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of the world's people.'⁸¹ As China has become more active in peacekeeping through both voting and constructing mandates, Chinese impact on peacekeeping has increased. We find that China is shifting the dialogue towards a greater emphasis on sovereignty and consent. China is, at the same time, supporting several "liberal" norms that appear outside of that strict interpretation of the UN Charter.⁸² This dialectic is difficult to understand in terms of behavior; however, it does have interesting consequences for peacekeeping, notably some ambiguous mandates and ambivalent, mercurial support as seen in the cases in the Sudan (Darfur) and East Timor. The shifting impacts of China on peacekeeping may not be unique to the state as the complex nature of peacekeeping creates a situation of the simultaneous necessity of intervention during crisis along with concerns of eroding sovereignty. Despite the dialectic nature of peacekeeping, there is the potential for Chinese ambivalence and ambiguity to shift toward clarity. One commentator argues that, "in the new century China will function as a more open, confident and responsible permanent member of the Security Council through its contributions to UN Peace Keeping Operations."⁸³ This aspiration rests on the view that increased involvement will lead to improved clarity. The prospects of this way forward are relevant, not inevitable; optimism and aspiration should be tempered by the complexities of peacekeeping.

In the end, this study is not centered on how China is conforming to the rules of the international community⁸⁴; this normative convergence is assumed. Rather, the paper looks to show how China, itself, is starting to shift those rules and norms. While the impact that China has on peacekeeping is related to its behavior, the concept that a state becoming newly integrated into a system would seek to alter that system is not exceptionally Chinese. In fact, the broad concepts examined in this study, political will or voting support for

⁸¹ Rosemary Foot. "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State". *The China Journal*, No. 45. Contemporary China Center: Australian National University, Jan 2001. Pg 6.

⁸² See Hempson-Jones, pg 722.

⁸³ Tiewa Liu. "Marching for a More Open, Confident and Responsible Great Power: Explaining China's Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations". *Journal of International Peacekeeping*. Volume 13, Numbers 1-2. January 2009. Pg 30.

⁸⁴ For arguments concerning China joining the international community see: Johnston, *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* and Margaret Pearson, "China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime". Eds Economy and Oksenberg. *China join the World*.

peacekeeping and mandate language, are issues encountered by all states involved in peacekeeping. Ambivalence is the limited action in the face of a crisis, whether it was Rwanda or initially in Darfur. Ambiguity in a peacekeeping mandate constrains the mission's on-the-ground activities. Through examining the impact of a state like China on peacekeeping, we can delve into these salient issues at the same time as we begin to understand the impact of a major international actor on UN peacekeeping.

Annex 1: Chinese Peace Operations Participation⁸⁵

Appendix 1. Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations as of August 2008⁶⁹

UN Peacekeeping Mission	Troops	Observers	Police	Total
MINURSO		13		13
MINUSTAH			127	127
MONUC	218	16		234
UNAMID	318	1		319
UNIFIL	343			343
UNMIK			18	18
UNMIL	566	4	10	580
UNMIS	439	14	18	471
UNMIT		2	21	23
UNTSO		4		4




Figure 2. Chinese troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, 1990–2008

Sources: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://conflict.sipri.org/>>; and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN mission's summary detailed by country", <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>.

⁸⁵ Liu, pg 130 and Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, pg 4.

Annex 2: UN Peace Operations and Chinese Security Council Voting on Passed Mandates (1973 to Present)⁸⁶

Start	End	Name	Acronym and Mission Type	Purpose	Region	Chinese Voting	UN Charter Chapter
1973	1979	UN Emergency Force II	UNEF II (Traditional)	Supervise withdrawal of forces from Sinai after Egypt-Israel conflict	Middle East	Abstain (14 to 0)	Ch VI (Res 340)
1974	Ongoing	UN Disengagement Observer Force	UNDOF (Traditional)	Maintain ceasefire between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights	Middle East	Abstain (14 to 0)	Ch VI (Res 350)
1978	Ongoing	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL (Traditional)	Supervise Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and help the Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area	Middle East	Abstain (13 to 0)	Ch VI (Res 426)
1988	1990	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP (Traditional)	Monitor Afghanistan and Pakistan from mutual non-interference	Middle East/South Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 622)
1988	1991	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	UNIIMOG (Traditional)	Supervise Iran-Iraq ceasefire	Middle East	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 619)
1989	1991	UN Angola Verification Mission I	UNAVEM I (Traditional)	Supervise withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 628)
1989	1990	UN Transition Assistance Group	UNTAG (Multidimensional)	Monitor Namibia elections and transition to independence	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 435 to 628)
1989	1992	UN Observer Group in Central America	ONUCA (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire in Nicaragua	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 644)
1991	2003	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM (Traditional)	Enforce Kuwait-Iraqi border after Gulf War	Middle East	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VII (Res 689)
1991	1995	UN Angola Verification Mission II	UNAVEM II (Robust)	Enforce ceasefire in Angolan civil war	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 696)

⁸⁶ NB This analysis does not include regional activities such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which China did not support. There is also limited information concerning UN peacekeeping mandate renewal resolutions.

1991	1995	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	ONUSAL (Multidimensional)	Enforce ceasefire in El Salvador war	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 693)
1991	Ongoing	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO (Traditional/Multidimensional)	Implement ceasefire and help promote referendum	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 658/690)
1991	1992	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	UNAMIC (Traditional)	Precede UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 717)
1992	1995	UN Protection Force	UNPROFOR and UNPRODEP (Multidimensional)	Protect area of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republic of Macedonia	Europe	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VIII (Res 743)
1992	1993	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	UNTAC (Transitional)	Assist development of Cambodia	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 728)
1992	1993	UN Operation in Somalia I	UNOSOM I (Multidimensional)	Enforce ceasefire, reorganized as Unified Task Force (UNTAF)	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 751)
1992	1994	UN Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire in Mozambique	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 782)
1993	1995	UN Operation in Somalia II	UNOSOM II (Robust)	Stabilize Somalia and assist humanitarian efforts	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VII (Res 814)
1993	1994	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	UNOMUR (Traditional)	To enforce ceasefire between Rwanda and rebel group	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 846)
1993	2009	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG (Traditional)	Enforce ceasefire between Georgia and Abkhaz separatists	Central Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 858)
1993	1996	UN Mission in Haiti	UNMIH (Traditional)	Stabilize Haiti after coup overturned	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 862)
1993	1996	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNAMIR (Multidimensional)	Monitor ceasefire, and after Rwanda genocide, to promote relief efforts	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 872)
1994	1994	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UNASOG (Traditional)	Monitor Libya's withdrawal from Chad	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 926)
1994	2002	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	UNMOT (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire in Tajikistan	Central Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 968)

1995	1997	UN Angola Verification Mission III	UNAVEM III (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire and disarmament	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 976)
1995	1996	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	UNCRO (Multidimensional)	Implement ceasefire	Europe/Central Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 990)
1995	1999	UN Preventive Deployment Force	UNPREDEP (Traditional)	Replaced UNPROFOR in Macedonia and monitored border	Europe/Central Asia	Vetoed extension ⁸⁷	Ch VI (Res 1026)
1995	2002	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH (Multidimensional)	Monitor human rights and providing police	Europe	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1035)
1996	1998	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium	UNTAES (Multidimensional)	Supervise integration of region into Croatia	Europe	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1037)
1996	2002	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	UNMOP (Multidimensional)	Monitor demilitarization of Croatia	Europe/Central Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1038)
1996	2000	UN Support Missions in Haiti	UNSMIH; UNTMIH; MIPONUH (Multidimensional)	Modernize police of Haiti and observe domestic changes	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Multiple)
1997	1997	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	MINUGUA (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire in Guatemala's civil war	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1094 with GA)
1997	1999	UN Observer Mission in Angola	MONUA (Traditional)	Monitor ceasefire and disarmament	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1118)
1998	2000	UN Mission in the Central African Republic	MINURCA (Multidimensional)	Maintain security and stability in Central African Republic	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1159)
1998	1999	UN Observer	UNOMSIL	Monitor disarmament	Africa	Positive	Ch VI

⁸⁷ NB China vetoed this mission for One-China policy reasons. See Paul Lewis. "Continuation of U.N. Force in Macedonia Faces a Chinese Veto". *NYTimes*. 25 February 1999. Accessed online: <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/continuation-of-un-force-in-macedonia-faces-a-chinese-veto.html>.

		Mission in Sierra Leone	(Traditional)	and demobilization in Sierra Leone		(unanimous)	(Res 1181)
1999	Ongoing	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	UNMIK (Transitional)	Exercise administrative authority	Europe	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1244)
1999	2005	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL (Robust)	Help stabilize and disarm Sierra Leone	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI and Ch VII (Res 1270)
1999	1999	UN Mission in East Timor	UNAMET (Traditional)	Oversee popular consultation on independence referendum	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1246)
1999	2002	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	UNTAET (Transitional)	Transition East Timor to independence	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VII (Res 1272)
1999	Ongoing	UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	UNOGBIS (Traditional)	Facilitate elections in Guinea-Bissau and implementation of the Abuja Agreement	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1233)
1999	Ongoing	UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUC (Multidimensional)	Monitor ceasefire in Democratic Republic of the Congo	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1279)
2000	2008	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE (Robust)	Enforce ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1320)
2002	2005	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	UNMISSET (Multidimensional/Transitional)	Ensure security and stabilize East Timor during the post-independence period	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1410)
2003	Ongoing	United Nations Mission in Liberia	UNMIL (Multidimensional/Robust)	Oversee ceasefire and train national police.	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (1509)
2004	Ongoing	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI (Traditional)	Facilitate implementation of peace process	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1528)
2004	Ongoing	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	MINUSTAH (Multidimensional)	Return stability to Haiti	South America	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1529)
2004	2006	United Nations	ONUB	Help implement the	Africa	Positive	Ch VI

		Operation in Burundi	(Multidimensional/Robust)	Arusha accords		(unanimous)	(Res 1545)
2005	Ongoing	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	UNMIS (Multidimensional)	Support implementation of the peace agreement and monitor human rights	Africa	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1590)
2006	Ongoing	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT (Multidimensional)	Support East Timor in consolidating stability and maintaining peace	Asia	Positive (unanimous)	Ch VI (Res 1704)
2007	Ongoing	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur	UNAMID (Robust)	Monitor arms trade and shipping, to help create and keep a ceasefire	Africa	Initial rejection the support	Ch VII/VIII (Res 1769)

Annex 3: Chinese circumstantial (use of force and domestic) voting⁸⁸

Table 1: China's Votes on Selected Resolutions Authorizing the Use of Force in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of Resolution	Type	Provisions*				Vote*	China's Explanation of Vote
				VII	NM	DF	PS		
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/770 08/13/1992	Protection of humanitarian assistance	Wider Peacekeeping	■	■			A	Against the use of force
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/776 09/14/1992	Incorporation of S/RES/770 into UNPROFOR's mandate	Wider Peacekeeping					A	Against the reference to S/RES/770
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/781 10/09/1992	Ban on military flights acting pursuant to S/RES/770	Wider Peacekeeping					A	Against the reference to S/RES/770
UNITAF** Somalia	S/RES/794 12/03/1992	Protection of humanitarian assistance	Peace Enforcement	■	■		■	Y	Against the role of pivotal states, but exceptional situation
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/836 06/04/1993	Protection of safe areas	Wider Peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but humanitarian situation
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/871 10/04/1993	Split of commands within UNPROFOR	Wider Peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but consent obtained
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/908 03/31/1994	Extension of close air support to Croatia	Wider Peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but limited to self-defense
UNAMIR Rwanda	S/RES/929 06/22/1994	Protection of refugees	Peace Enforcement	■	■		■	A	Against the use of force and lack of consent
MNF** Haiti	S/RES/940 07/31/1994	Establishment of stable environment	Peace Enforcement	■	■		■	A	Against the role of pivotal states and the use of force
UNCRO Croatia	S/RES/981 03/31/1995	Establishment of UNCRO	Wider Peacekeeping	■	■	■	■	Y	Against the use of force, but consent obtained
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/998 06/16/1995	Incorporation of Rapid Reaction Force	Peace Enforcement	■			■	A	Against changing peacekeeping mandate to enforcement action
IFOR** Bosnia	S/RES/1031 12/15/1995	Replacement of UNPROFOR	Peace Support Operation	■	■		■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request and exceptional situation
UNTAES Croatia	S/RES/1037 01/15/1996	Establishment of UNTAES	Transition Management	■		■	■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request
SFOR** Bosnia	S/RES/1088 12/12/1996	Replacement of IFOR	Peace Support Operation	■	■		■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request
UNMIK Kosovo	S/RES/1244 06/10/1999	Establishment of UNMIK	Peace Support Operation	■	■		■	A	Principle concerns, but consent obtained

Table 1: China's Votes on Selected Resolutions Authorizing the Use of Force in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (Continued)

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of Resolution	Type	Provisions*				Vote*	China's Explanation of Vote
				VII	NM	DF	PS		
INTERFET** East Timor	S/RES/1264 09/15/1999	Establishment of stable environment	Peace Enforcement	■	■		■	Y	—
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone	S/RES/1270 10/22/1999	Establishment of UNAMSIL	Peace Support Operation	■		■	■	Y	—
UNTAET East Timor	S/RES/1272 10/25/1999	Establishment of UNTAET	Peace Support Operation	■	■			Y	—
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone	S/RES/1289 01/07/2000	Enhancement of security	Peace Support Operation	■		■	■	Y	—
MONUC Congo	S/RES/1291 02/24/2000	Extension of MONUC	Peace Support Operation			■		Y	—
UNMISSET East Timor	S/RES/1410 05/27/2002	Replacement of UNTAET	Peace Support Operation	■	■			Y	—
ECOFORCE** Cote d'Ivoire	S/RES/1464 02/04/2003	Authorization of ECOFORCE	Peace Enforcement			■	■	Y	—
ECOMIL** Liberia	S/RES/1497 08/01/2003	Establishment of stable environment	Peace Enforcement	■	■		■	Y	—
UNMIL Liberia	S/RES/1509 09/19/2003	Establishment of UNMIL	Peace Support Operation	■		■		Y	—
UNOCI Cote d'Ivoire	S/RES/1528 01/27/2004	Establishment of UNOCI	Peace Support Operation	■	■	■	■	Y	—
MIF** Haiti	S/RES/1529 02/29/2004	Establishment of stable environment	Peace Enforcement	■	■			Y	—
MINUSTAH Haiti	S/RES/1542 04/30/2004	Establishment of MINUSTAH	Peace Support Operation	■		■	■	Y	—
ONUB Burundi	S/RES/1545 03/21/2004	Establishment of ONUB	Peace Support Operation	■		■		Y	—
UNMIS Sudan	S/RES/1590 03/24/2005	Establishment of UNMIS	Peace Support Operation			■		Y	—

* VII: "Acting under Chapter VII"; NM: "all necessary means", "all necessary measures", or "all necessary steps"; DF: Use of force is limited to the defense of U.N. personnel, of their freedom of movement, and of civilians under imminent threat; PS: Role of pivotal states or alliances; A: Abstention; Y: Yes.

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⁸⁸ From Stefan Staehle. "China's Participation in the United Nation Peacekeeping Regime". MA Thesis. George Washington University, 2006. Pg 101-103.

Table 2: China's Votes on Selected Resolutions Addressing Domestic Issues within U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of Resolution	Type	Vote*	China's Explanation of Vote
UNMIH Haiti	S/RES/975 01/30/1995	Establishment of UNMIH	Wider Peacekeeping	A	Against the mandate and size of UNMIH
UNMIH Haiti	S/RES/1048 03/29/1995	Final extension at reduced size of military component	Wider Peacekeeping	Y	Incorporations of amendments and at request
UNSMIH Haiti	S/RES/1063 06/28/1996	Maintenance of law and order and training of police	Wider Peacekeeping	Y	Against the presence of U.N. military personnel, but at request
UNOMIG Georgia	S/RES/1077 10/22/1996	Integration of Human Rights Office	Wider Peacekeeping	A	Against the Human Rights Office
MPF ** Albania	S/RES/1101 03/28/1997	Establishment of stability and security	N.A.	A	Against the interference in internal affairs and the invocation of Chapter VII, but at request
MONUA Angola	S/RES/1118 06/30/1997	Replacement of UNAVEM III	Wider Peacekeeping	Y	Against matters that fall within the terms of other U.N. bodies
MIPONUH Haiti	S/RES/1123 30.07.1997	Training of police	Wider Peacekeeping	Y	Against the extension of the peacekeeping mandate, but at request
UNMIBH Bosnia	S/RES/1144 12/19/1997	Establishment of UNMIBH	Peace Support Operation	Y	Cautious about issues such as judicial reform and economic matters
OSCE** Kosovo	S/RES/1199 09/23/1998	Monitoring of humanitarian situation	N.A.	A	Against the interference in internal affairs and the invocation of Chapter VII
OSCE** Kosovo	S/RES/1203 10/24/1998	Call for compliance with OSCE observers	N.A.	A	Against the interference in internal affairs and NATO's decision to use force
MINURCA Angola	S/RES/1230 02/26/1999	Extension of MINURCA	Wider Peacekeeping	Y	Against the interference in military restructuring
MONUC Congo	S/RES/1493 07/28/2003	Protection of civilians in Ituri and Kivu	Peace Support Operation	Y	—
AMIS** Sudan	S/RES/1556 07/30/2004	Authorization of interna- tional monitors in Darfur	N.A.	A	Against the invocation of Chapter VII
AMIS** Sudan	S/RES/1564 09/18/2004	Investigation of human rights violation in Darfur	N.A.	A	Against pressure, but support of African Union

* A: Abstention; V: Veto; Y: Yes.

** Non-U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

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